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INTRODUCTION
Life sciences, biotechnology, and medical
biology are indispensable research fields for
public health and the development of ther-
apeutics and vaccines. However, biological
agents and information developed to better
health, welfare, and safety, could be mis-
used for harmful purposes to cause damage
to public health, safety, and the environ-
ment (1–3), which is termed the “dual-use”
aspect of research in the life sciences. Lab-
oratory biosafety describes containment
principles, technologies, and practices to
protect people from biological agents, and
prevent accidental release of biological
agents (4). In addition to biosafety, labo-
ratory biosecurity measures aim to prevent
theft and intentional or malicious use of
biological agents (4). Thus, both biosafety
and biosecurity should be an integral part
of program management of organizations
handling dangerous pathogens, in order to
prevent potential dual-use research, unde-
sired spread, theft, malicious use, and
bioterrorism.
FROM BIOTERRORISM TO BIOSECURITY
The biosecurity program of organizations
should contain physical, personnel, trans-
port, technology, and material security (5).
In addition, personnel should be well edu-
cated and aware of the biorisks of han-
dling dangerous pathogens (1, 4–6). Theft
and malicious or terrorist use of biological
agents could possibly be traced back to
breaches or lacunas in the biosecurity pro-
gram of an organization. The next three
historical examples of malicious use of
biological agents illustrate the importance
of biosecurity measures within organiza-
tions. The first example is the intentional
spread of Salmonella typhimurium, which
led to more than 750 cases of gastroen-
teritis in Oregon, USA, 1984. Members
of the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh commune
ordered Salmonella bacteria from a com-
mercial supplier, cultured the bacteria in
their laboratory,and contaminated 10 salad
bars (7). Criminal investigation revealed
that the Salmonella outbreak strain was
indistinguishable from the strain that had
been cultured in the laboratory at the com-
mune. The source of the biological material
was a legitimate, easily accessible source,
which underlines the importance of biose-
curity awareness and the proper function-
ing of the biosecurity program of orga-
nizations. The second example of mali-
cious use of biological agents is a biological
attack in Japan. The Japanese religious cult
Aum Shinrikyo tried to produce large-scale
botulinum toxin and spores of Bacillus
anthracis. The members isolated harmless
strains of Clostridium botulinum from soil
and thereby failed to produce active botu-
linum toxin in 1990 (8). For the produc-
tion of anthrax, the members unsuccess-
fully attempted to steal B. anthracis from a
laboratory. Later, the cult received anthrax
from an Aum Shinrikyo sympathizer that
had access to the biological agent within a
university (8). However, this was an animal
vaccine strain of anthrax, and not causing
disease during dissemination, in 1993 (8).
Thus, biosecurity pillars such as physical
security, personnel screening, and person-
nel reliability are important in preventing
theft of biological agents and bioterrorism.
The last example describes the anthrax let-
ters containing spores of Bacillus anthracis
in 2001 in the USA. In total, 22 people
were infected of which 5 people died. The
source of the biological agent was a state
laboratory involved in the national biode-
fense program of the USA (9). In addition
to personnel screening and personnel reli-
ability, material control and accountabil-
ity might play an important role in pre-
venting future malicious use of biological
agents.
DUTCH BIOSECURITY INITIATIVES
The Dutch government recognizes the need
to reduce biological threats and to pre-
vent malicious use of biological agents.
Therefore, the Dutch government and the
Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sci-
ences (KNAW) published the “Code of
Conduct for Biosecurity” in 2007 (10). The
code is intended to guide organizations
and professionals that are, directly or indi-
rectly, engaged in research or education in
the life sciences, such as biology, medical
biology, or biotechnology. Life sciences
quickly evolve and new biosecurity and
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dual-use questions rise, such as the world-
wide H5N1 biosecurity debate in 2011,
2012 (3). Therefore, the KNAW published
the advisory report “Improving biosecu-
rity, assessment of dual-use research” in
2013 (3). This report recommends biolog-
ical threat analyses and an advisory board
for research in the life sciences. Further-
more, the report emphasizes the impor-
tance of raising early awareness for the
risks and potential misuse of research and
knowledge in the life sciences.
In response to international biosecurity
initiatives (11–15) and the evolving life sci-
ences, the Dutch government initiated a
biosecurity project to establish a coordi-
nated Biosecurity Program for organiza-
tions handling hazardous biological agents
and associated technology, in 2009. The
purpose of this Biosecurity Program is to
prevent proliferation of biological materi-
als and associated knowledge for illegiti-
mate purposes. As part of the Biosecurity
Program, the Dutch Biosecurity Office was
founded in 2012. The Biosecurity Office is
the national knowledge and information
center for biosecurity, and offers awareness
raising workshops. The Biosecurity Office
utilizes previously adopted good practices
from both national and international ini-
tiatives, such as the BTWC, the EU CBRN
Action Plan, CWA 15793, and the Dutch
Biosecurity Code of Conduct. The Biosecu-
rity Office cooperates with existing relevant
organizations, such as the Dutch Platform
of Biosafety Professionals. The biosecurity
policy in the Netherlands reflects the cur-
rent worldwide trend to combine biosafety
and biosecurity into biorisk program man-
agement (4, 15).
ONLINE “BIOSECURITY TOOLKIT”
In close collaboration with the Dutch
Platform of Biosafety Professionals and
other experts, the Biosecurity Office devel-
oped the online “Biosecurity Toolkit,” in
2012 and 2013. The Biosecurity Toolkit
aims at enhancing biorisk management
within organizations handling hazardous
biological materials. The Toolkit is a self-
assessment tool that is freely available via
www.biosecuritytoolkit.com in Dutch and
in English. The Toolkit is an easily acces-
sible tool for professionals and organi-
zations to analyze gaps in their institu-
tional biosecurity management. The out-
come of the Toolkit includes best practices
per biosecurity pillar to improve the biose-
curity level of the organization. The use
of the Toolkit is anonymous and online
results are not stored. The Toolkit helps
organizations to assess their current level
of biosecurity and combines biosafety and
biosecurity into biorisk.
METHODS
The Biosecurity Toolkit has specifically
been developed for organizations han-
dling hazardous or dangerous biological
agents. Representatives from those organi-
zations, governmental representatives, and
biosafety/biosecurity experts were invited
to participate in the development process
of the Biosecurity Toolkit. This group of
stakeholders and experts convened in sev-
eral meetings to compose the toolkit and
ascertain applicability of the Toolkit for the
intended users.
QUESTIONNAIRE
The experts defined eight pillars of biose-
curity risk management, namely aware-
ness, personnel reliability, transport secu-
rity, information security, accountability
for materials, response, management, and
physical security (5, 6, 16). The biosecu-
rity experts added the eighth pillar “man-
agement” to the Biosecurity Toolkit, since
the management of an organization should
also be aware of biological risks, and com-
mitment of the higher management is a
prerequisite for successful implementation
of the biorisk management program. A
short description per biosecurity pillar is
provided in Figure 1A. Per biosecurity pil-
lar, the user needs to answer up to 10 ques-
tions with“yes”or“no”in the questionnaire
(Figure 1B), and the relative score for each
category is normalized to 100%. In case of
doubt or uncertainty, the user is advised to
fill in “no,” so the associated suggestion for
improvement will be addressed after ful-
filling the Toolkit. Each question is accom-
panied with explanatory or background
information, accessible via the informa-
tion icon (Figure 1B). The questionnaire
can be saved and interim results can be
viewed between different pillars, at every
convenient time for the user.
LEGAL BASIS AND GOOD PRACTICES
Supplemental information about legal
basis and good practices is provided under
the tab page “Good practices” (Figure 1C).
The information under “Basis” refers to
national and international laws, guidelines,
standards, and other relevant documents
that are available in the Netherlands, such
as the Biosecurity Code of Conduct (10)
and CWA 15793 (15). The column “Good
Practices” lists specific biosecurity mea-
sures that may increase the biosecurity level
of that particular biosecurity pillar. The
good practices have been formulated in
collaboration with experts from the field.
RESULTS SECTION OF THE TOOLKIT
After completing the questionnaire, the
user is directed to the results section of the
Toolkit and the outcome of the survey is
automatically presented to the user. Rela-
tive scores for each category are calculated
as a percentage (actual score as percentage
of the maximum achievable score). Impor-
tantly, the overall score is not calculated as
an average of the individual scores, but is
equal to the lowest score obtained in the
separate elements. The overall score is pre-
sented as lowest score since the aim of the
survey is to identify gaps and strengthen the
biosecurity program, which is most effec-
tively obtained by improving the weakest
element in an organization.
EXAMPLES AND CONCLUSION
The type of organization, the biological
agents handled by the organization, the
risks associated with executing proceed-
ings, the dual-use potential or likelihood
that an agent can be misused, and many
more variables are important for design-
ing and implementing a biosecurity pro-
gram within the organization (6, 16). To
illustrate the use and possible gap analysis
of the Biosecurity Toolkit, we hypotheti-
cally describe two types of organizations
handling dangerous pathogens: a high-
containment diagnostic laboratory from
a university medical center, and a high-
containment laboratory from a pharma-
ceutical company.
HIGH-CONTAINMENT DIAGNOSTIC
LABORATORY IN A UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
CENTER
For diagnosed or suspicious hazardous
material, the university medical center has
a BSL3 facility. Only authorized personnel
are allowed to enter and conduct labora-
tory work in the BSL3 facility. Reference
material and patient samples are stored
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within the containment of the BSL3 facility.
Since the laboratory is part of a university
medical center, knowledge is shared among
different departments and potential haz-
ardous samples may be used for research or
scientific purposes. The employees are fully
aware of biosafety risks; however, there is
less awareness for biosecurity and dual-use
risks of the samples. Entrance to the BSL3
facility has been restricted to authorized
employees only, however, the medical cen-
ter is a public, open organization and out-
siders can easily enter the hospital. There
is no security culture within the center.
The medical center scores well on external
transport security; however, internal trans-
port of diagnostic samples that are used for
scientific purposes is pore documented in
procedures. The same applies for informa-
tion security: the university medical center
has guidelines for confidentiality of patient
samples, but no guidelines for securing and
following research samples. The hospital
has procedures for emergency and crisis
response, and has a clear policy of com-
munication in case of emergencies. Thus,
the fictive gap analyses for the medical
center identified gaps for biorisk manage-
ment system, physical measures, biosecu-
rity awareness, and personnel reliability.
The center scores well on material account-
ability and response, and scores average on
information security and transport secu-
rity.
LABORATORY IN A PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANY
This pharmaceutical company develops
vaccines against airborne influenza viruses.
The company has BSL3 animal facilities
and laboratories for research purposes. The
company is located in a rural area and
has strict entrance security. Employees are
background checked and research is well
documented, since patents and intellectual
property are important for the develop-
ment of vaccines. The organization has
high standards regarding general security,
biosafety regulations and well-documented
research, recorded in standard operat-
ing procedures, and procedures describing
coding of materials. The fictive gap analy-
ses for the pharmaceutical company iden-
tified gaps for biosecurity awareness and
response, specifically in case of dual-use
research awareness. Although personnel
are well educated and trained for handling
dangerous airborne pathogens, this train-
ing has been focused on biosafety and not
on biosecurity awareness. The same applies
to response and incidents: response in case
of biosafety incidents and theft have been
documented in procedures and covered in
FIGURE 1 |The online BiosecurityToolkit has eight biosecurity pillars.
(Continued)
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FIGURE 1 | Continued
(A)The eight biosecurity pillars were adapted from previous studies (5,
16) and were ascertained by the Dutch biosecurity expert group and
biosecurity stakeholders. In the left column, the pillars are placed in the
order of appearance in the online Toolkit. In the right column, a short
description per biosecurity pillar is provided. (B)The pillars are placed in
the tab pages on the top of the webpage where the questionnaire for
“Awareness” is shown. By clicking on the subsequent pillar, the
questions become visible and can be answered with “yes” or “no.” The
yellow “i” information button provides information about the specific
question. The online questionnaire can be saved between pillars, and
interim results can be viewed at any convenient time. By clicking the
“reset” button, the form will be cleared from previously entered
answers. (C). The tab page “Good Practices” contains legal bases and
good practices for biosecurity program improvement. By clicking on
specific biosecurity pillars, a list with links, best practices, and
information is available with suggestions for improvement of the
biosecurity program within organizations.
the employee training; however, no proce-
dures are present regarding emerging dual-
use research. Thus, the company scores
well on personnel reliability, physical mea-
sures, material accountability, and infor-
mation security. The company scores less
on response and biorisk management, since
biosafety and biosecurity are not integrated
in the company.
CONCLUSION
Here, we describe an online self-assessment
“Biosecurity Toolkit,” which was devel-
oped to strengthen awareness among lab-
oratory employees, biosafety or biosecu-
rity officers, the management team, or
security managers of organizations han-
dling dangerous biological agents. The
web-based Biosecurity Toolkit offers a free
and easily accessible tool and the result-
ing gap analysis of the questionnaire is for
internal use only. The results are anony-
mous and not automatically uploaded or
stored. The main purpose of the toolkit
is to provide the user insight in the level
of biosecurity within the organization, to
create awareness and above all, to pro-
vide suggestions for improvement of the
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biosecurity level by focusing on the weakest
elements.
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